In his book 'Naming the Mind', Kurt Danziger criticizes the circular nature of intelligence definitions, specifically that intelligence is often defined as 'what intelligence tests measure', resulting in circular reasoning without independent external reference.
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HARDLY BS — Verdict: Mostly True
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The Short Version
The claim accurately captures the direction of Danziger's critique but oversimplifies his philosophical argument. In *Naming the Mind*, Danziger does criticize the definition "intelligence is what intelligence tests measure" as lacking independent external grounding. However, his precise argument is that this operational definition establishes a "reference" (denotation) without establishing "sense" (meaning) — a nuanced semantic critique, not a straightforward charge of logical circularity. The core substance is sound; the framing is imprecise.
Caveats
Danziger's actual argument distinguishes between 'reference' and 'sense' — a philosophical point about meaning — rather than explicitly labeling the definition as 'circular reasoning' or tautology.
The claim reduces Danziger's broader cultural-historical critique (that psychological categories are not natural kinds) to a narrow logical fallacy, omitting significant context about his thesis.
The phrase 'circular reasoning without independent external reference' is the claim's characterization, not Danziger's own language; his critique concerns the semantic incompleteness of operational definitions.